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Abstract 
Better policy coordination between Europe, Japan, and the United States is urgently needed in order 
to restore conomic growth and to diminish mutual trade imbalances. Using the EC Compact model 
it is shown how coordinated fiscal policies can contribute to reaching these goals in the 1990s. For 
Europe, the most plausible fiscal policy option seems to be a combination of lower direct axes, public 
spending cuts, and wage moderation; for Japan a more expansionary fiscal policy is feasible. For the 
United States, however, public spending cuts or tax increases are necessary conditions for better 
economic performance. Inaddition, for all three blocks a swap between tax reduction and wage modera- 
tion is recommended. 
In a recent lecture, Yoshio Okawara (1991) said that the major countries of the 
world--i.e., Europe, Japan, and the United Statesmshould share responsibility and 
the burden for maintaining the peace and welfare of all nations, including those 
under different political systems. In this respect Okawara mentioned as a first area 
on which the joint efforts should focus the issue that " . . .  a substantial amount 
of trade imbalance is feared to remain between Japan and the United States in 
the years ahead. ''~ The fear of sustained substantial trade imbalances is certainly 
not a specific American-Japanese problem. It is also a question of great concern 
for the future relations between Japan and the European Community (EC). In a 
speech (1991) at the fifth annual EC-Japan journalists' Conference in Osaka, Euro- 
pean Commission Vice-President Frans Andriessen said: " . . .  we remain very con- 
cerned by the important and persisting deficit of the trade pattern between the 
EC and Japan. According to the most recent Japanese figures, that deficit 
deteriorated from 18.4 billion U.S. dollars to over 23 billion U.S. dollars in the first 
10 months of 1991. . .  If the economic forecasters are right, Japan will continue 
to generate large current account surpluses through the 1990s." And according 
328 KNOESTER AND KOLODZlEJAK 
to Dries van Agt (1990), former EC ambassador to Japan and the present EC am- 
bassador to the United States, ". . .relations between the Community and Japan 
are less strained than transpacific ones, though many of the problems tackled by 
the Americans are ours as well. Our trade deficit with Japan is $24 billion now, 
half of the American deficit with that country, but nonetheless unacceptably huge... 
It is worth noting in this context that presently the United States and the Community 
are almost on balance in their bilateral trade." 
We quite agree with Okawara (1991) that in avoiding sustained trade imbalances 
"...anyprotectionist attempts such as managed trade should be blocked at any 
costs. Both sides should make utmost efforts to solve problems through rational 
and practical talks and by not allowing economic problems arising from these im- 
balances to develop into serious political issues." Apart from possible serious 
political problems, the threat of increasing protectionism or volatile exchange rate 
fluctuations between the European, American, and Japanese currencies is reason 
enough to look for proper ways to find a solution for these trade imbalances. In 
this article we will not discuss the question as to what extent a further reduction 
in trade barriers may contribute to this issue. Nor will we discuss exchange rate 
policies, because Japanese export prices fall when the yen appreciates, as Hooper 
and Marquez (1993) have noted. We will focus on the question as to how a better 
coordination of macroeconomic policies between Europe, the United States, and 
Japan can contribute to fewer trade imbalances. In discussing such international 
policy coordination, not only the issue of diminishing structural trade imbalances 
is at stake. At the same time one should keep in mind that, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
economic growth slowed down drastically in Europe, Japan, and the United States 
compared with the annual growth rates obtained before the first oil crisis of 
1973-1974. Medium- and long-term forecasts of various international organiza- 
tions point to substantially lower future growth rates compared with the growth rates 
of the golden 1960s. Recently, this has resulted in a "Declaration on Cooperation 
for Sustained Global Expansion" that was adopted at the conclusion of the 40th 
meeting of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund in order "to strengthen growth prospects" (IMF 1993). Thus the 
goal of a reduction in international trade imbalances should be combined with the 
aim of restoring economic growth in the world's dominant economic blocks. At the 
same time deficit adjustment should be taken into account, but not at the expense 
of lower global output, as Currie and Whitley (1993) presume. 
In analyzing these global targets of economic policy one should be aware that 
the world economy has become more interconnected over the past quarter cen- 
tury and that national economies have grown so interdependent as to make 
economic disturbances readily transmittable (see, e.g., Cooper 1985, OECD 1987, 
Fieleke 1988, Ghosh and Masson 1993). Obviously, policies to diminish trade im- 
balances and to restore economic growth in Europe, Japan, and the United States 
cannot be seen as purely domestic. 2 Every such policy has important effects on 
the others and policy actions taken in one block should be prevented from harm- 
ing the economic policy targets of the other blocks, making the total effect on the 
three blocks counter-productive. This requires a measure of policy coordination 
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between the three blocks on the basis of their own specific economic starting posi- 
tions. This does not mean we are disregarding the coordination critique of, for ex- 
ample, Vaubel (1983), Feldstein (1987, 1988), and Frankel and Rockett (1988). Our 
view on the need for macroeconomic policy coordination and its potential benefits 
is presented in Kolodziejak (1986); Knoester, Kolodziejak, and Muijzers (1989, 1990); 
and in Knoester and Kolodziejak (1992). 
The interdependent global economic system quickly outgrows analytical treat- 
ment, so that the questions raised can be consistently analyzed only by using a 
simulation framework containing both domestic and international dynamic economic 
interactions. The pioneering work done by Schouten (1964); Johnson and Klein 
(1974); Oudiz and Sachs (1984); Frankel (1988); McKibbin and Sachs (1988); Can- 
zoneri and Minford (1988); Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1989); and others has 
demonstrated the usefulness of such an approach which, unlike the traditional 
Fleming-Mundell approach, also takes into account longer-term dynamic processes. 
In this article we will use the Compact model, developed by the European Com- 
mission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. This is a world 
model consisting of three interacting blocks (Europe, Japan, and the United States) 
facing the rest of the world economy. 
In Section 1 we shall briefly discuss past economic developments and medium- 
and long-term forecasts for Europe, Japan, and the United States. In Section 2 
we will introduce the main tool of analysis for the said international policy coordina- 
tion viz. the said multicountry Compact model. This section further contains a com- 
parison of Compact's fiscal multipliers with those of other models, as well as a 
brief outline of the principle of the inverted Haavelmo effect. In Section 3 different 
types of fiscal policy will be quantified on the assumption that Europe, Japan, and 
the United States will act on a purely individual basis. Special emphasis is given 
to the combination of a tax reduction and wage moderation in order to improve 
the individual competitive position through a strengthening of the supply-side of 
the economy. Section 4 discusses the need for economic policy coordination be- 
tween Europe, Japan, and the United States with special emphasis on how to 
diminish mutual trade imbalances and how to restore economic growth, and Sec- 
tion 5 contains concluding remarks. We will use the term Europe throughout he 
text as a shortcut expression for the Community of 12 EC-Member States, unless 
it is clear from the context that the Community of six is meant (before 1973). 
1. Facts and forecasts 
In Europe, Japan, and the United States economic growth was buoyant in the 
1960-1973 period, with Japan outperforming the other two areas with average an- 
nual growth rates of almost 10%. For Europe the average was 5% and for the United 
States nearly 4%. After the first oil crisis, growth rates dropped substantially in 
all three blocks, falling to about 3.5% a year in Japan over the 1974-1982 period, 
and in Europe and the United States to between 1.5% and 2% a year. Table 1 
shows that in Europe and the United States annual economic growth improved 
330 KNOESTER AND KOLODZIEJAK 
n- 
o 
e- 
¢.. 
o 
.~_ 
r -  
g 
r -  
e- 
.g 
r r  
0 
O) 
O~ 
(0  
0O 
1 , -  
b,, 
0 
e~ 
m 
0 
~- 0 
• t -  
r -  o 
• r -  
n 
(Otn(O 
I 
~- o)  nn 
~ o  
I~ cO co 
Or )~ 
E 
:E 
0 
LIJ 
~0 
rn  
n 
0 
a 
0 
ILl 
0 
EL 
0 
UJ 
Z 
Z)  
"1~ 
0 
(1) 
Q.  
r~ 
O9 
c(.5 
o .~o~ 
O u 
'-(.9 
O O 
.~o~ 
o.o 
h.. 
c~ 
~-~-o  
t*O O.I O4 
LO LOh.*  
COOl ' , -  
I..O o3 (O 
c~dc~ 
03 .v- T- 
"~-OO 
I I ' 
cO t*~ o.I 
o-'E 
O'~ 
m 
13. 
o 
O) 
O 
UJ 
09 
O') 
~.) 
I -  
E 
E 
O 
t-. 
Q. 
,o 
- I  
ILl 
Q 
"6 
r -  
._o 
F= 
E 
O (.) 
O,I 
O') 
O) 
1 -  
a 
I..U 
O 
O.1 
O') 
O') 
LL 
GO 
CO 
t -  
O 
Q 
o ~ 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s 331 
in the 1983-1991 period. Although rather outstanding in the United States, the im- 
provement has been more modest in Europe, whereas in Japan average growth 
increased further compared with the level of the 1974-1982 period. Medium-term 
scenarios developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Euro- 
pean Community, and the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) suggest that, com- 
pared with the 1983-1990 period, in the 1991-1995 period growth will slow in the 
United States, as well as in Japan and Europe. The weighted average slowdown 
amounts to about 0.8% points compared with the 1983-1990 period, and to about 
3% points compared with the 1960-1973 figures. On the whole, these medium- 
term scenarios foreshadow relatively modest growth rates. Even the highest growth 
scenarios predict substantially lower growth than before the first oil crisis of 1973. 
Table 1 also suggests that the surpluses on the Japanese current account of the 
balance of payments are approximately equal to the sum of the forecasted trade 
deficits of the United States and Europe. 
Table 2. Long-term scenarios for the average growth rate of real GDP. 
Japan United States Europe a 
Realizations 
1960-1973 9.7 3.9 4.8 
1974-1990 4.0 2.4 2.4 
Forecasts b 
1991-2000 
OECD-A 3.4 
OECD-B2 4.3 
MIT 1 3.7 
MIT 2 2.5 
LEONTIEF C/X 3.6 
WB-L 2.5 
WB-H 4.3 
UN-B 3.8 2.8 2.5 
UN-H 4.3 3.5 3.7 
CGM-P 3.3 2.9 2.5 
CGM-B 3.7 3.2 2.6 
CGM-0 4.0 3.4 2.8 
T-FAiS IV 4.0 3.8 4.3 
FUGI-B 4.1 2.5 2.6 
WZB-GLOBUS 3.6 3.0 2.7 
ai.e., European Community. 
bWeighted average growth rate for total OECD-area or industrial world. 
Sources: OECD-A, OECD-B2 from OECD (1979); MIT 1, MIT 2 from MIT (1977); LEONTIEF C/X from 
LEONTIEF et al. (1977); WB-L, WB-H from World Bank (1987); UN-B, UN-H from United Nations (1988); 
CGM-P, CGM-B, CGM-O from Centre for Global Modeling, Onishi (1986); T-FAIS IV from University 
of Tsukuba-Foundation for Advancement of International Science, Shishido (1983); FUGI-B from Onishi 
(1988); WZB-GLOBUS from Bremer (1987) and ten Brink (1988). 
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Table 2 shows several long-term growth scenarios for the 1991-2000 period. 
For the three blocks together, expeced economic growth varies between average 
rates of 2.5% and 4.3% a year. As for the individual blocks, Japan is expected to 
have the highest growth rates, whereas the European and American growth rates 
will be about the same, at a lower rate. The long-term growth scenarios show the 
same tendencies as the medium-term ones. Here again the anticipated growth 
rates are substantially below the 1960-1973 ones, although slightly higher than 
in the 1974-1990 period. Table 3 surveys the past bilateral trade imbalances among 
Japan, the United States, and Europe. This table makes perfectly clear how in the 
1980s the surpluses of the Japanese trade balance accelerated and are reflected 
in corresponding trade deficits in the United States and Europe. The table also 
confirms the statement by Van Agt (1990) that Europe's bilateral trade deficit with 
Japan is about half the American deficit. The data, in essence, justify the need 
for improved economic policy coordination among the three blocks. 
Table 3, Japanese bilateral trade balance with the United States and Europe ($ billions). 
Total Japanese Bilateral Trade Balance Bilateral Trade Balance 
Trade Balance with the United States with Europe 
1976 2.42 3.88 3.61 
1977 9.69 7.32 4.54 
1978 18.20 10.13 5.03 
1979 -7.64 5.97 5.10 
1980 -10.72 6.96 8.81 
1981 8.74 13.31 10.34 
1982 6.90 12.15 9.50 
1983 20.53 18.18 10,40 
1984 33.61 33.08 10.07 
1985 46.10 39.49 11.12 
1986 82.74 51.40 16.69 
1987 79.71 52.09 20.02 
1988 77.56 47.60 22.80 
1989 64.96 45.70 19.85 
1990 52.37 38.28 18.71 
1991 78.26 38.57 27.64 
1992 107.04 44.02 31.50 
1993 128,23 52.82 37,80 
Source: Keizai Koho Center (1989), IMF (1993a); figures for 1993 are estimates based on realizations 
in the first quarter of that year. 
2. An overview of the EC Compact world model 
Compact, the macroeconomic model for the world economy, was developed in 1985 
by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs. Since then it has been frequently used in the Commission Services' 
medium-term analyses. The first version of the model was described in Dramais 
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(1986) and new developments in Dramais (1987). 3 In essence, the world economy 
consists of the behavioral models for Europe, the United States, and Japan, in- 
teracting against the rest-of-world block, which is mainly a residual item to ensure 
world accounting consistency for international trade and capital flows. 4 The Euro- 
pean module includes all the basic elements of an operational model: 
• a final demand block 
• a production and factor demand block 
• a wage and price block 
• a public-sector block 
® a monetary block 
• a linkage and balance-of-payments block 5 
Given its relatively small size, the model is used as a testing ground for some 
new developments in applied econometrics. It should also be understood that the 
European Community as a homogeneous unit is but a temporary experiment. Leav- 
ing aside trade linkage, the EC module includes 50 endogenous variables deter- 
mined by 28 behavioral equations and 22 identities. The U.S. and Japanese 
modules were constructed from the structure contained in the Japanese govern- 
ment's Economic Planning Agency (EPA). These two modules were compacted 
from 18-70 behavioral equations, the coefficients of which are combinations of 
the original parameters. The rest-of-world module includes only international trade 
and capital variables, and an estimate of GDR as computed in the 1983 LINK model. 
In this module, current and capital account balances are determined to ensure 
world consistency, that is, to ensure that current and capital world balances sum 
to zero. The linkage equations allocate imports among the four zones and com- 
pute dollar import prices as the weighted average of dollar export from the four 
zones. Following Dramais (1986), the basic structure of Compact can be summar- 
ized as follows: 
1. The model takes into account both stock and flow equilibrium by means of a 
"flow of funds matrix"; 
2. Wealth effects play a role in the determination of private consumption; 
3. Total unemployment is divided into classical, Keynesian, and frictional unemploy- 
ment according to a disequilibrium approach of the labor market; 
4. The difference between Keynesian and classical unemployment plays also a 
role in the wage and price determination process; 
5. The balance of payments is linked to the government budget deficit and the 
money supply; 
6. The exchange rate is influenced by the current and capital accounts and floats-- 
reserves are a constant ratio of imports. 
In general, Compact describes fairly well the economic performance of the EC 
in the 1973-1985 period. The Compact model, as described in Dramais (1986), 
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has been revised to incorporate two new member countries, Spain and Portugal, 
into the aggregate EC module, and includes improvements suggested by members 
of the EC "Experts Group" and professional economists. Similarly, the results from 
the U.S. and Japanese modules have been tested during the Seminar on Empirical 
Macroeconomics for Interdependent Economies, organized in March, 1986 by the 
Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. (Bryant et. al. 1988). There, simulations 
from 12 multinational models were compared with reference to a common baseline. 
An analysis of U.S. and Japanese results showed that the Compact results were 
consistent with the "consensus" multipliers given by 9-10 models out of 12 (the 
major outliers being the Minford's model and Sim's Var model). Table 4, which con- 
tains a summary of the results, shows that Compact multipliers are in line with 
the multipliers of alternative models. This conclusion is confirmed by a survey on 
the effects of taxation in 18 economic models by Knoester and Kolodziejak (1992). 
In Compact, taxes affect the economy in traditional and nontraditional ways. Tax 
increases depress demand, and hence output, in the traditional sense that they 
decrease disposable income. In addition, there is a nontraditional forward shifting 
effect; namely higher tax rates and/or higher social security contributions cause 
Table 4. Comparison of fiscal policy multipliers of Compact and other multicountry models (simulation 
effect in percent point deviation from common baseline in second year of increase in government ex- 
penditure of 1 percent of GDP). 
i currency CA CA* i* 
Y CPI (pts.) value ($b) ($b) (pts.) CPI* Y* 
Standardized baseline 2.8 3.6 -2.5% -88.5 44.7 4.1 3.5 
Fiscal expansion in U.S. Effects in U.S. Effects in non-U.S. 
MCM Multicountry 1.8 0.4 1.7 2.8 -16.5 8.9 0.4 0.4 0.7 
EC Compact 1.2 0.6 1.5 0.6 -11.6 6.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 
OECD Interlink 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.4 -14.2 11.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 
LINK Project 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 -6.4 1.9 NA 0.0 0.1 
Liverpool 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.0 -7.0 3.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 
Fiscal expansion in 
non-U.S. OECD Effects in non-U.S. OECD Effects in U.S. 
MCM Multicountry 1.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 -7.2 7.9 0.5 0.2 0.5 
EC Compact 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.6 -9.3 3.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
OECD Interlink 1.5 0.7 1.9 0.9 -6.9 3.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 
LINK Project 1,2 0.1 NA 0.1 -6.1 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Liverpool 0.3 0.8 0.0 3.3 -17.2 11.9 0.8 3.1 0.5 
Source: Frankel (1988). Deviations in percent or percent points from standardized baseline. Y = GDP, 
CPI = Consumers Price Index, inflation, i -- real short-term interest rate, CA = U.S. Current Account, 
CA* -- Current Account of non-U.S. OECD, i.e., japan, Germany, U.K., and Canada. The Federal Reserve 
Board Multicountry Model is described in Edison et al. (1986); the OECD Interlink Model, e.g., in OECD 
(1979b) and Richardson (1987); the Project Link, e.g., in Johnson and Klein (1974) and Hickman (1985); 
the Liverpool World Model in Minford, Ag~nor, and Nowell (1986). 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s 335 
higher real wages. As explained in Knoester and Van der Windt (1987), the ra- 
tionale for this behavior can be found in wage bargaining models in which 
employees bargain with employers, not for real income, but for real net income. 
The outcome is that employees will claim higher real wages in the event of increas- 
ing tax rates and/or social security contributions. This forward shifting of taxation 
has also been modeled in Compact by the inclusion of the net after-tax wage rate 
in the equation for the nominal wage costs. Dramais (1986) estimates that a fall 
in the purchasing power of the net after-tax wages by 1% will be followed by an 
increase of nominal wage costs by about 0.4% in the following year. 
The forward shifting of taxation implies the inverted Haave/mo effect, which is 
the opposite of the Keynesian Haavelmo effect (Knoester 1983, 1991, 1993). The 
latter says that, as a consequence of a simultaneous increase of both public spend- 
ing and taxes--i.e., by a balanced budget--the effects on income and employment 
would be positive (Haavelmo 1945). According to the inverted Haavelmo effect, 
the positive balanced-budget multiplier changes into a negative balanced-budget 
multiplier. The reason is that higher tax rates mean higher real wages, lower pro- 
fits, and hence lower investments, less economic growth, and more unemployment. 
These negative effects of taxation more than offset the positive effects on the 
economy of the concomitant higher public spending, in reverse, the principle of 
the inverted Haavelmo effect implies that a simultaneous cut in public spending 
and taxation will lead to faster economic growth and less unemployment, hus pro- 
viding a theoretical and empirical basis for supply-side policies. We will return to 
this issue in the next section. 
3. individual fiscal policies 
Given the medium- and long-term growth scenarios discussed earlier, policymakers 
in Europe, Japan, and the United States will try to increase growth. At the same 
time these blocks have a common interest in diminishing their mutual trade im- 
balances. In this section we will discuss some fiscal policy options which, given 
these conditions, seem plausible when each of the three blocks acts on a purely 
individual evel. This means that the three blocks will try to raise, or at least main- 
tain, economic growth under the restriction of other economic policy goals, such 
as improving the external balance (e.g., diminishing the surpluses in the case of 
Japan) or decreasing the government budget deficit. In terms of game theory, the 
outcome will be a Nash solution, that is noncooperative (Nash 1950, Nash 1951, 
McMillan 1986). 
The most plausible options for Europe to stimulate economic growth by fiscal 
policies are lower taxation with a higher budget deficit, and lower taxation with 
an ex ante simultaneous decrease in public spending, the latter combined with 
wage moderation. Table 5 shows the medium-term effects of such policies using 
Compact. It appears that only a tax reduction would result in more economic growth, 
more inflation, and less unemployment. Obviously, Compact shows, on balance, 
a Keynesian outcome. Yet, there are serious negative side effects, such as a higher 
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Table 5, Effects of once-and-for-all fiscal policy measures taken by Europe alone. 
Tax Reduction, 
Tax Reduction Public Spending 
and Public Cuts and Wage 
Europe a Tax Reduction b Spending Cuts c Moderation d
Change in levels after year 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Real GDP (%) 0.20 0.47 -0.54 0.13 -0.80 0.43 
GDP Deflator (%) 0.00 0.67 -0.13 -0.47 -0.60 -1.12 
Unemployment Rate -0.07 -0.13 0.13 -0,13 0.21 -0.57 
Budget Deficit c (-) (% GDP) -0.60 -0.40 0.00 0.07 -0.08 0.21 
Current Balance (%GDP) -0.07 -0.26 0.13 0.00 0.21 0.01 
ai,e. European Community. 
bDecrease in direct taxes by 1% of the wage bill. 
CSimultaneous decrease in direct taxes and public spending by 1% of the wage bill. 
dSimultaneous decrease in direct taxes and public spending and wages by 1% of the wage bill. 
eBudget deficit of general government, 
inflation rate, an increased budget deficit and, last but not least, a deterioration 
in the balance of payments. Note also that Compact certainly does not confirm 
the claim made by supply-side economics in its simplest form--and practiced by 
the Reagan administration in the early 1980s--that a tax rate reduction would 
enlarge the tax base so as to raise tax revenues. 6 Compact simulations show that 
in the medium run only one-third of the original increase in the budget deficit can 
be reduced. This outcome for Europe seems to correspond remarkably with the 
American experience. According to Lindsey (1985), one-third of the tax cuts made 
by the Reagan administration in 1982 were "earned back." Thus, the American 
experience does not appear to be a good example for Europe to follow. 
Even so, there is growing consensus in Europe that tax cuts may have positive 
supply-side effects on economic growth and employment. At the same time, it is 
recognized that such tax cuts should not be financed by increasing budget deficits; 
that is, tax cuts financed by a simultaneous cut in public spending. Knoester (1983, 
1988a, 1988b, 1991, 1993) argues that such a policy would boost economic growth 
and reduce unemployment through the inverted Haavelmo effect. Table 5 shows 
that, as a result of a simultaneous decrease in public spending and direct taxes, 
economic growth decreases in the short run. This means that the short-term fin- 
dings of Compact confirm the Keynesian Haavelmo effect instead of the inverted 
Haavelmo effect. However, after a certain delay, these outcomes change completely. 
In the medium run, economic growth shows an increase instead of a decrease. 
Hence, Compact simulations are consistent with the thesis of the inverted Haavelmo 
effect, though only in the medium run and to a lesser extent than in Knoester (1983, 
1988a, 1988b). 7 Knoester and Kolodziejak (1992) compare taxation across 18 
models and find that in Compact the cumulated effect of a once-and-for-all de- 
crease in direct taxes of 1% of GDP, financed by a simultaneous decrease in public 
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spending, results in the following time profile of Dutch production: -0.7% after 
1 year, -0.2% after 3 years, and 0.6% after 5 years. In contrast, for all models 
examined, the average effect on production was -0.2%, 0.0%, and 0.4%, respec- 
tively. The outcomes for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
France were in line with the overall average effects. In any case, tax reductions 
financed by simultaneous public spending cuts seem to be a better alternative for 
Europe than tax cuts financed by increasing budget deficits because of favorable 
consequences on the inflation rate, the government budget deficit, and the balance 
of payments in combination with an increase in economic growth. Finally, it should 
be noted that the positive effect of this policy on the government budget deficit 
implies that the ex ante zero budgetary effects of this policy mix turn positive (ex 
post) in the medium run. This is caused by the enlarged tax base resulting from 
the increased economic growth. 
A far better picture emerges even when the simultaneous decrease in public 
spending and direct taxes is accompanied by a corresponding wage moderation. 
Technically, wage moderation was simulated in the way put forward by Tinbergen 
in his 1936 presentation of the world's first empirical macroeconomic model. As 
discussed in Knoester and Wellink (1993), Tinbergen reacted with surprise to a 
question asking how the endogeneously modeled wage rate equation could be 
used for an autonomous wage decrease: "The trick is that, in that wage equation, 
the relationship which is assumed for wages is, for one moment, made inoperative 
and that, instead, it is assumed that wages show a decrease, independently of 
the forces acting on them." We have followed Tinbergen by expanding the wage 
rate equation with an autonomous shift variable bearing a coefficient of 1.0. The 
motivation for wage moderation can be found in wage bargaining models, where 
employees bargain for net real income. In European countries like The Netherlands, 
the offset between wage moderation and tax reduction is viewed rationally by the 
"social" partners--namely the government, employees, and employers. The 
benefits of this policy mix can be attractive for all three parties because employers 
are not confronted with increasing wage costs, employees will maintain their real 
net income, and government may benefit from the country's improved competitive 
position, inducing a broader tax base and less unemployment. An additional motiva- 
tion for employees to moderate their wage claims is justified by the behavior of 
trade unions, especially in Europe and Japan, aimed at raising the medium- and 
long-term benefits of their members instead of focusing on short-term goals that 
may prove counterproductive in the longer term. The combination of tax reduc- 
tion, public spending cuts, and wage moderation shows better outcomes than tax 
reductions without wage moderation. Better results are obtained for the unemploy- 
ment rate, the government budget deficit, the balance of payments, the inflation 
rate, and economic growth. In judging these results it should be noted that possi- 
ble overriding market forces that may diminish the initial positive effects of this 
policy mix are included in the Compact model. 8 Hence, for Europe, this policy mix 
seems the better alternative for restoring economic growth and lowering unemploy- 
ment, given the specific European starting conditions for its current balance and 
its budget deficit. 
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Japan has much greater fiscal opportunities for pursuing economic growth 
policies than Europe and the United States. Today, Japan has a large balance-of- 
payments surplus and a small government budget deficit. In addition, Japanese 
public spending share of GDP is lower than in Europe and the United States-- 
about 32% compared with about 52% and 38%, respectively. 9Table 6 shows the 
results of stimulating fiscal policies for Japan. Attractive results in terms of economic 
growth are obtainable through tax reductions or higher public spending. The 
resulting deterioration in the current account would be modest compared with the 
present large surpluses and with the attendant gains in economic growth and 
unemployment. The simulations suggest that, for Japan, an increase in public 
spending that is financed initially by a higher budget deficit is the most growth- 
promoting policy option. 
The primary interest of U.S. policymakers may not be so much to increase 
economic growth as to cut the government budget deficit and the current account 
deficit, preferably while maintaining economic growth or otherwise minimizing the 
negative growth effects. Table 7 shows that tax rate increases and public spend- 
ing cuts would lower the American twin deficits at the expense of economic growth. 
A policy of tax rate increases may even saddle the U.S. economy with the addi- 
tional problem that the higher rates may be shifted forward into higher wages 
(Knoester 1983, Knoester and Van der Windt 1987). Table 7 shows that, when tax 
increases lead to a forward shifting of taxation, the loss in economic growth and 
employment becomes worse. So the best option of the United States seems to 
be to curb the budget deficit through public spending cuts. 
Table 6. Effects of once-and-for-all fiscal policy measures taken by Japan alone. 
Tax Reduction 
and Public Increase in 
Japan Tax Reduction a Spending Cuts b Public Spending c 
Change in levels after year 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Real GDP (%) 0.26 0.36 -0.46 -0.43 0.73 0.80 
GDP Deflator (%) 0.03 0.38 -0.03 0.07 0.07 0.27 
Unemployment Rate -0.03 -0.13 0.10 -0.00 -0.13 -0.13 
Budget Deficit (_)d (%GDP) -0.49 -0.35 0.00 -0.03 -0.60 -0.43 
Current Balance (% GDP) -0.05 -0.23 0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 
aDecrease in direct axes by 1% of the wage bill. 
bSimultaneous decrease in direct axes and public spending by 1% of the wage bill. 
Clncrease in public spending by 1% of the wage bill, 
dBudget deficit of general government. 
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Table 7. Effects of once-and-for-all fiscal policy measures taken by the United States alone. 
Tax Increase and Public Spending 
United States Tax Increases a Wage Increase b Cuts c 
Change in levels after year 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Real GDP (%) -0.27 -0.54 0.06 -0.67 -0.87 -0.47 
GDP Deflator (%) -0.05 -0.67 0.45 -0.07 -0.12 -1.00 
Unemployment Rate 0.08 0.40 -0.02 0.47 0.35 0.53 
Budget Deficit d (-) (% GDP) 0.54 0.46 0.64 0.40 0.47 0.39 
Current Balance (% GDP) 0.06 0.23 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.23 
alncrease in direct taxes by 1% of the wage bill. 
bSimultanecus increase in direct taxes and wages by 1% of the wage bill. 
°Decrease in public spending by 1% of the wage bill. 
dBudget deficit of general government. 
4. Coordinated fiscal policies 
The individual fiscal actions of Europe, Japan, and the United States would, of 
course, have effects on each other. Therefore, we have quantified the effects of 
fiscal policy measures taken in each block, including the feedback effects on the 
other two blocks. The feedback effects of such "joint" or "coordinated actions" 
run through the international trade and capital linkages of Compact. A plausible 
policy mix for the 1990s follows from the above discussion of the most likely in- 
dividual fiscal policy measures. Table 8 contains the results of this policy mix, con- 
sisting of a simultaneous reduction in wages, direct taxes, and public spending 
in Europe; an increase in public spending in Japan; and a decrease in public spend- 
ing to cut the budget deficit in the United States. This policy mix would have the 
best effects on economic growth in Japan, while diminishing the Japanese current 
account surpluses. For Europe too, economic growth gains would be substantial, 
Table 8. Effects of a joint action of Europe, Japan, and the United States* 
Europe a Japan United States 
Change in levels after year 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Real GDP (%) -0.87 0.43 -0.49 0.61 -0.89 -0.35 
GDP Deflator (%) -0.61 -1.21 0.07 0.11 -0.13 -0.92 
Unemployment Rate 0.25 -0.50 -0.09 -0.05 0.35 0.43 
Budget Deficit (-) (% GDP) -0.08 0.14 -0.61 -0.50 0.53 0.29 
Current Balance (% GDP) 0.17 -0.02 -0.34 -0.32 0.14 0.21 
*A simultaneous once-and-for-all decrease in wages, direct taxes, and public spending by 1% of the 
wage bill in Europe, an increase in public spending in Japan, and a decrease in public spendina in 
the United States. 
ai.e., European Community. 
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while improving the balance of payments in the short run. Economic growth would 
decline in the United States, whereas the twin deficits would diminish. Note that 
the best effects on unemployment would occur in Europe, while the best effects 
on the budget deficit and the balance of payments would occur in the United States. 
These different outcomes are, of course, mainly due to the chosen composition 
of the policy mix, which in turn is the result of the specific starting positions of 
the three blocks. Alternative policy mixes are possible, of course. 
An example of an alternative coordinated action is presented in Table 9: the three 
blocks pursue a policy of tax reduction and wage moderation. In The Netherlands 
this policy mix became well known as the Schouten Scenario (Schouten 1982, 
1986). The key element in substituting wage moderation for tax reduction is that 
the government offers tax reductions to employees and employers in exchange 
for wage moderation. Such a "swap" could be formalized in the form of a social 
covenant among the parties. The simulations show a substantial increase in 
economic growth in the three blocks, albeit at the expense of higher budget deficits 
and with virtually unchanged external imbalances. It should be emphasized that, 
in the medium run, the "earn-back" effects of this joint action would be substan- 
tial. In Europe and Japan, the enlarged tax base would be about two-thirds of the 
initial increase in the budget deficit, and in the United States it would be about 50%. 
Finally, Table 10 shows another policy scenario: wage moderation and tax reduc- 
tion in Europe, a tax reduction in Japan, and a U.S. increase in taxes and wages. 
The fact that this time there is no simultaneous wage moderation in Japan implies 
for this country smaller effects on economic growth, smaller reductions in unemploy- 
ment, and a larger budget deficit. However, compared with the previous joint ac- 
tion, a current account deficit now results for Japan, which is in line with the goals 
of international policy coordination. In addition, European economic growth is 
negatively influenced by lower foreign growth resulting from lack of wage modera- 
tion in Japan and the United States. Although the Schouten Scenario still leads 
on balance to higher economic growth in Europe, the latter is now accompanied 
by a larger increase in the budget deficit. For the United States, the results are 
less favorable compared with the Schouten Scenario in Table 9, although they dif- 
fer only slightly from the mix presented in Table 8. 
Table 9. Effects of a joint action by Europe, Japan, and the United States: a once-and-for-all simultaneous 
tax reduction and wage moderation.* 
Europe a Japan United States 
Change in levels after year 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Real GDP (%) -0.07 0.94 -0.02 0.78 -0.04 0.85 
GDP Deflator (%) -0.47 0.13 -0.52 -0.60 -0.44 0.08 
Unemployment Rate 0.01 -0.67 0.01 -0.23 0.02 -0.69 
Budget Deficit (-) (% GDP) -0.68 -0.22 -0.59 -0.18 -0.64 -0.30 
Current Balance (% GDP) 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 0.12 0.01 0.04 
*Amounting to 1% of the wage bill. 
ai.e., European Community. 
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Table 10. Effects of a joint action by Europe, Japan, and the United States: a once-and-for-all simultaneous 
wage moderation and tax reduction in Europe, increase in wages and taxes in the United States, and 
tax reduction in Japan.* 
Europe a Japan United States 
Change in levels after year 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Real GDP (%) -0.09 0.62 0.18 0.17 0.11 -0.49 
GDP Deflator (%) -0.47 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.44 0.10 
Unemployment Rate 0.02 -0.46 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.36 
Budget Deficit (-) (% GDP) -0.67 -0.30 -0.54 -0.47 0.69 0.38 
Current Balance (%GDP) 0.00 -0.15 -0.10 -0.13 0.01 0.10 
*Amounting to 1% of the wage bill. 
ai.e., European Community. 
For a proper assessment of the results reported in this section it should be noted 
that in Compact public spending is treated as a pure consumption good that is 
substitutable with private consumption. However, the concomitant negative income 
effects of public spending cuts do not influence the labor supply behavior, as a 
result of which, for example, the labor supply could rise and wages could fall fur- 
ther. Yet, this labor supply behavior does not imply a serious bias for the results 
of the policy simulations. This is so because the negative income effects of public 
spending cuts will be outweighed by the positive income effects of the 
simultaneously pursued tax reductions. It should be emphasized that the above 
results should certainly not be interpreted as offering a free lunch for OECD govern- 
ments. First of all, both Europe and the United States have to cut public spending 
in order to achieve a better economic performance in the 1990s. This is a difficult 
task for policymakers because past experience has shown that politicians and the 
public are unwilling to make such public spending cuts for favorable future effects 
that they regard to be uncertain. More economic growth and a reduction of cur- 
rent account imbalances in the OECD area, however, remain essential to long-run 
economic performance. And this simple truth should be the incentive for OECD 
governments to pursue the suggested international policy coordination. Such 
policies could prevent our children and grandchildren from being confronted with 
more draconian public spending cuts. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
It is of great importance for Europe, the United States, and Japan to restore 
economic growth to levels that occurred before the first oil crisis of t973-1974. 
However, at the same time these leading blocks of the world economy have to 
reduce the existing and projected trade imbalances. Otherwise, increasing pro- 
tectionism and volatile exchange rate movements will pose a serious threat to the 
world's economic prospects in the 1990s, as well as to harmonious political rela- 
tions. Hence, there is a need for improved economic policy coordination among 
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Europe, the United States, and Japan in the 1990s. In this article we have anal- 
yzed some plausible coordinated fiscal policy actions of the world's three leading 
economic blocks, concentrating on different mixes of fiscal policies. Our main con- 
clusions can be summarized as follows: 
• For Europe, the most plausible fiscal policy option for the 1990s seems to be 
a combination of lower direct taxes, public spending cuts, and wage modera- 
tion. This policy mix will produce higher economic growth and less unemploy- 
ment, while the external imbalance and the government budget deficit remain 
unchanged or even show a slight improvement. 
• For Japan, the degrees of freedom enjoyed by fiscal authorities are much greater 
than in Europe and in the United States. An expansionary Japanese fiscal 
policy--either through lower direct tax rates or higher public spending--therefore 
seems a plausible option for the 1990s. This policy would boost economic growth 
and diminish Japan's current account surpluses. 
• For the United States, public spending cuts or tax increases are necessary con- 
ditions for achieving the desired reduction in the twin deficits. Such a policy, 
however, would entail a lower rate of economic growth. 
• Under a coordinated fiscal policy action, the benefits for economic growth would 
be larger in Europe and Japan than those obtained by uncoordinated actions. 
For the United States, the improvement in the twin deficits would be substantial. 
• A joint action of tax reduction and wage moderation would further raise economic 
growth. Our analysis suggests that in the medium run the earn-back effects of 
this policy mix would vary between two-thirds and one-half of the initial increase 
in the government budget deficit. Although attractive in terms of economic growth, 
this type of collaborative action would not diminish the trade imbalances among 
the three blocks. 
• The suggested policies should not be interpreted as offering a free lunch for 
OECD governments. Their policymakers face a difficult task to implement cor- 
rective actions, because the public, especially in the United States and Europe, 
regard the benefits from these actions as uncertain. Yet, without such actions 
our children and grandchildren will face larger public spending cuts. 
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Notes 
1. See also Butler (1992). 
2. For a general theoretical framework, see Tinbergen (1954, especially chapters 6-8), A brief com- 
ment is given in Molle (1990) and Kol and de Wolff (1993). 
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3. For simulation purposes, specific software has been developed by Dramais to simplify the use of 
Compact by macroeconomists (Dramais 1986a). 
4. The EC module is somewhat stylized because the introduction of institutional constraints and na- 
tional specifics must wait for the development of national models with monetary sectors under the 
EC QUEST and HERMES projects. 
5. The estimation is done on yearly data using primarily the EC aggregate series published in the 
Statistical annex of the "Annual Economic Review" (European Economy, November issue). The 
sources for the series are Eurostat and Commission Services. 
6. See Laffer (1980) and Feldstein (1986) who criticizes what he calls "supply-side xtremists." 
7. The reason for these different quantitative outcomes is that--contrary to Knoester (1983, 1988a, 
1988b, 1991, 1993)--the wage equation of Compact does not include an explicit but an implicit for- 
ward shifting of higher taxes into higher wages. 
8. Such an overriding market force is, for example, the Philips curve mechanism included in Com- 
pact. If the unemployment rate should decrease as a result of the suggested substitution between 
wage moderation and tax reduction, wage claims would increase in the second instance. Our simula- 
tions with Compact suggest, however, that the effects of these market forces are certainly not strong 
enough to compensate for or to undo the positive effects of this policy mix. 
9. Shares for 1993 are based on the European Economy Statistical Annexes of the European 
Commission. 
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